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Abstract: This paper focuses on the meaning of translation (Über-setzung) in Heidegger’s late work. The 
German prefix über- suggests a „jump” from one field of experience to another, thus implying a duality of the 
„own” and the „other”. This seminal duality will be examined by studying the etymology of the English word 
„translation”, which will bring to the fore the key role played by the verb „to bear”, understood as an 
essential enabling of the „other” to stand on its own in the horizon of the „own”. The paper will then focus 
on the significance of „enabling” as the very sense of translation and will discuss the rendering of the central 
Heideggerian term Ereignis as „enowning” by the American translators P. Emad & K. Maly in 1999. 
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 In the following I would like to focus on the central sense of translation in Martin 
Heidegger’s later works. I will start with one of his last lectures and make some comments 
on a few lines regarding the sense of translation. I will then try to translate on my own the 
English word “translation” and show how its etymology yields some surprising results. The 
sense of translation will reveal itself as an essential act of one’s own, namely to enable the 
other to stand on its own. I will then bring into account the term Ereignis, which Heidegger 
regards as the central word of his later work and see how it summarizes the very essence of 
translation. Finally, I will make some short comments on the excellent English translation 
of Ereignis as “enowning” by Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly in their translation of the 
seminal work of Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy, translated in 
1999). 
 
 Let us now deal with the first aspect, namely: what does translation (Übersetzung) 
mean for the later Heidegger? Eleven years ago I had the chance to translate into 
Romanian one of Heidegger’s last Freiburg lectures, called Parmenides, dating from 1943.1 
At the beginning of this lecture dedicated to Pre-Socratic philosophy, Heidegger speaks 
about the difficulty of translating the Greek word aletheia simply as “truth”. Instead, his 
proposal sounds totally different from the tradition, namely: “unconcealment”, 
Unverborgenheit. The criterion by which we know that this second translation is a “better” 
one is the fact that the word “unconcealment” attempts at transposing us (uns übersetzt) into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Heidegger, M.: Parmenides, GA 54. Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 1992. 
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the originary Greek field of experiencing the aletheia.2 To translate therefore means to 
transpose the reader into another field or zone of experience (Erfahrungsbereich). Instead of 
speaking of a better “understanding” of a Greek word by way of translation and thus 
employing philosophical termini pertaining to the activity of the intellect and of the mind, 
Heidegger chooses a more simple and spatial way of describing the translational act. 
Germans call “translation” Übersetzung, which means literally “trans-posing”, moving from 
one point to another. The German prefix über- (trans-) suggests the crossing over to…, the 
journey between at least two spaces or fields. Thus, Heidegger works with a very simple and 
intuitive duality between my own field and another, more strange field of experience. 
He then adds a most important idea: translating does not take place, at first, 
between two languages, i.e. between my own native language and a foreign one. The act of 
translating is already at work in any dialogue between two speakers of the same language – 
and even in any dialogue one has with himself.3 Being an introduction to a lecture, the text 
doesn’t elaborate very much on this special phenomenon of translation as a constant 
movement. But according to the Heidegger from Being and Time (especially §§ 31-32), we 
know that this essential movement happens because man understands by way of projecting 
himself to a certain field or horizon. And this project takes as a base for its jump an already 
existing horizon into which man is “thrown” by his facticity (e.g. place of birth, parents, 
native language, etc.) We have here an essential duality of man’s being.4 The Parmenides-
lecture assumes tacitly these facts when Heidegger argues that we only understand when 
the things that are to be understood “trans-pose themselves to another truth, clarity or even 
questionability”5. Thus, the duality of the “own” and the “other” field or horizon is 
constituent of every act of thinking, understanding or learning, be it expressed by words or 
done in silence. Man is always on the way to the “other” and only through such a journey 
does man have access to that what he or she calls “self”, or “own”. The access to my 
“own” is thus primarily a question of translation.  
Heidegger then speaks about great poets and thinkers, who have the exceptional 
capacity of “trans-posing us to a different riverside”.6 What this foreign riverside means, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ibid., p. 16. 
3 Ibid., p. 17. 
4 In his course from the summer semester 1923, Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), GA 63, Heideggers calls 
this duality „hermeneutics of facticity”, thus employing a double genitive (i.e. a subjective and an objective 
one) in order to render the circular movement contained in the human being: that of projecting and of being-
thrown.  
5 Heidegger, M.: Parmenides, p. 18. 
6 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Heidegger tells us by reiterating the word “field” or “zone” (Bereich) he had already 
mentioned. It is “the field of a transformed truth” (Bereich einer gewandelten Wahrheit). 
Speaking formally, this new riverside is the field into which, by way of reading, learning or 
understanding the words of great poets or thinkers, man transposes himself. Through this 
journey, man stabilizes himself anew, after becoming slightly different of the man he used to 
be. Poets and thinkers are masters of the interplay between the “own” and the “other”. 
 Before leaving this lecture from 1943, let me notice a last but most important 
aspect. At a certain point, Heidegger uses two different ways of writing the same German 
word for “translation”, namely Übersetzen. This happens when he argues that the mere fact 
of establishing the equivalents of foreign words in my own language by way of the “so-called 
translation” (“das sogenannte Übersetzen”) is only possible when our essence has 
undergone a previous trans-lation or trans-position (“Übersetzen”) to “the field of a 
transformed truth”. What does Heidegger mean by this different accentuation of the 
composing parts of the word Über-setzen? He privileges the prefix über-, trans-, because he 
wants to stress the moving and itinerant part of any translation, i.e. the journey by which 
the “own” and the “other” begin to emerge as two different parts which are intimately 
connected, whereas the need to establish a clear-cut equivalent for foreign words is in 
danger of suppressing the always itinerant and fertile process of understanding and 
learning.  
 
 Let us now examine the English word “translation”, and let us translate it ourselves 
to a different riverside. This means that we will have to settle down in a field of experience 
quite alien to the trivial way of understanding the translational act. Heidegger’s favourite 
way of transposing his academic audience to another riverside is to examine the etymology 
or history of the terms he has begun to use in an apparently innocent manner. Let us 
imitate Heidegger. “Translation” derives from the Latin verb trans-fero. We have already 
noticed the journeying character of the prefix trans-, but what does fero mean? 
Etymologically, fero belongs to the same Indo-European family as the Greek phero, the 
German bringen and the English to bring. To the same family belong the German gebären, “to 
give birth”, and the English birth and to bear. We could therefore translate the Latin word 
fero as to bring and to bear. But is this rendering of fero of any help for our effort to 
understand the deeper sense of translation? Let us take a closer look at those two English 
verbs, to bring and, especially, to bear. We all know the expression “a woman bears a child”, 
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which means that she gives birth to a child, i.e. she bears inside of herself a child to the 
point where this child can subsist in the world by itself. The verb “to subsist by itself” 
includes also the fact of being able to receive food in order to survive in the world. The 
“itself” is here very important, because “being born” means exactly to be able to stand on its 
own as an entity capable of living, feeding, growing and even dying by itself. We can see 
now that the “own” and its stability needs a previous enabling7 by an “other” in order to be 
that “own” that it is. The “own” is brought and borne into being by the “other”, whereas 
the “other” constitutes itself as other only in relation to this “own” which is being borne by 
him. Both “own” and “other” are necessary constituents of a deep relation of enabling and 
being enabled.  
What does this “enabling” exactly mean? To which horizon of understanding does 
it belong? In the end, enabling is a rather mysterious relation for mankind, insofar as we are 
accustomed to assign it to “nature” and to natural processes like giving birth. But what is 
nature? Since the Greeks, nature (physis) has been understood by way of dichotomies: 
nature and art, nature and spirit, nature and history, nature and divine grace, etc. Heidegger 
has shown in numerous lectures that the combination of Greek philosophy and Christian 
theology has brought to the fore a productive or poietic interpretation of nature: everything 
that is is an ens creatum by an ens increatum, i.e. God. This Greek model of being as making and 
being made (poiesis) perpetuates itself today and constitutes the basis of technology and of the 
impressive productivity of things. Science and scientific theory are dominated by the causal 
way of seeing nature and natural processes.8 The very fact that we tend to understand 
translation as an establishing act, by way of dictionaries, of equivalents of foreign words or 
texts is a distant consequence of the same technical and productive way of understanding 
human processes and nature in general. 
 But what if we attempt to recuperate this mysterious and enabling act of giving 
birth and being borne? Throughout his whole work, Heidegger is interested exactly in the 
recuperation of the enabling and in the necessary critique and deconstruction of the making, 
i.e. of the strictly causal-productive-technological way of being. It could be that mysterious 
processes like speaking, understanding, learning, translating, etc. belong rather to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I owe this term to Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly, who use it in their explanation of the translation of the 
Heideggerian term Ereignis as “enowning”. Cf. Emad, P. & Maly, K.: Translators’ Foreword. In: Heidegger, M.: 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Bloomington-Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1999. I will 
discuss further below the significance of this translation. 
8 On this topic, cf. Heidegger, M.: “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”. In Heidegger, M.: Vorträge und Aufsätze, 
GA 7. Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 2000, especially pp. 42-45. 
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enabling experience of life itself, like being born and giving birth, and therefore cannot be 
established, i.e. systematized, reproduced or re-made without losing their very essence. 
What is then the deeper sense of translation? Let us make use of the new “riverside” that 
has emerged: I mean the space of birth and bearing. True translation is not the establishing 
of firm and reproductive equivalents for a foreign word, proposition or text, but the enabling 
of a foreign entity by letting it be born in my own element. By this process, I constitute myself as a 
“field“ (Bereich) or as an element that can let the foreign be foreign, i.e. give birth to it in my 
dimension. The “other” becomes my own “other”, it starts a life as “other” within the 
limits of my element. Simultaneously, the “other” alters my “own” by its presence and lets 
my “own” become aware of its own-ness. It is like parents becoming aware of their 
parenthood only by giving birth to a child. It is the pure and irreducible presence of the 
child that makes the parents aware of their parenthood and no other experience.  
On a few occasions9, Heidegger notices the difference that German language makes 
between “being equivalent” (das Gleiche) and being one-and-the-same (das Selbe). The first is 
a purely indifferent relation, based on equality between related things and on the 
assumption that each entity is identical with itself, whereas the second brings together totally 
different things and unites them in a unity that never assumes a totalitarian regime. On the 
contrary, it is this very kind of unity that lets free and enables each constituent to be the thing 
that it is. The unity is for the sake of its constituents, so that each of them emphasizes to 
the full its particularity and difference, i.e. the “own”-ness and the reciprocal “other”-ness.  
The word “difference” has also a nice story to tell, if we look at its etymology. The 
“difference” derives ultimately from the Latin differentia and is akin to the Greek diaphora. 
We recognize the same Latin verb fero and the Greek phero. In Greek, the prefix dia- has a 
double sense: 1. “through”, “across”; and 2. “to the full”, “from one end to the other”. 
Whereas the first sense implies a mere separation due to the cutting-through, the second 
sense implies the more profound differentiation due to the completion of the bearing 
process. The Greek expression gastros onkon diapherein means “to bear to the end the child in 
the womb”, i.e. to bear a child till the very end, when the child will “differentiate” itself 
totally from its mother. The unity of mother and child is for the sake of letting be and of 
enabling the child to be on its own. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Take for example the conference “»...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch...«”, in: Heidegger, M.: Vorträge und 
Aufsätze, GA 7. Frankfurt a.M., V. Klostermann, 2000, pp. 196-197. 
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We have now enough elements to grasp the deep and original sense of the duality 
constituted by the “own” and the “other” implied in any true translation. This exceptional 
and mutual enabling duality has been named by Heidegger Ereignis and has been translated 
into English as “enowning”. Let us briefly turn our attention to this central word of 
Heidegger’s later writings, because it summarizes all experiences I have brought into 
discussion so far. As I mentioned at the beginning, I favour the English translation of this 
word as “enowning” such as it has been proposed by the two translators P. Emad & K. 
Maly, and disagree with common translations like “event” or “appropriation”. Such 
translations are mechanical and technical equivalences but no real enablings of the sense 
Heidegger has bestowed on the German word Ereignis. In the Translators’ Foreword of the 
translation of Heidegger’s later work Contributions to Philosophy Emad & Maly explain why 
they have chosen to translate Ereignis with “enowning”. I will simply quote a few lines from 
their text that explain the ability of the English prefix en- to render the German prefix er- 
from Ereignis:  
We found a good approximation to Ereignis in the word enowning. Above all it is the 
prefix en- in this word that opens the possibility for approximating Ereignis, insofar 
as this prefix conveys the sense of “enabling”, “bringing into condition of”, or 
“welling up of”. Thus, in conjunction with owning, this prefix is capable of getting 
across a sense of an “owning” that is not an “owning of something”. We can think 
this owning as an un-possessive owning, because the prefix en- has this unique 
capability. In this sense owning does not have an appropriatable content.10  
At another point in their defence of the word “enowning”, Emad & Maly reject the 
translation of Ereignis as “appropriation”. I will again quote a few illuminating lines: 
First, “appropriation” is more static than the German Ereignis in Heidegger. This 
English word conveys a sense of stability that is foreign to the vibrancy of Ereignis. 
Second, and most important, “appropriation” brings to mind the act of seizing 
something without negotiating, which would misconstrue Ereignis as an active 
agent, as one highly bent on ruling and dominating. “Appropriation” proved not 
to be a viable option because it strengthens the misconception of Ereignis as agency 
of seizing, ruling and hegemony.11 
Let us resume the main arguments of the two translators and see how they converge on the 
same spot as ours, or, to put it otherwise, how they move in the same field of experience as 
that we have been describing before. Although Emad & Maly don’t mention it expressly, I 
presume that the thoughtful experience of “enabling” has suggested to them the idea of 
translating Ereignis as “enowning”. This means that they have previously understood the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Emad, P. & Maly, K.: Translators’ Foreword. In: Heidegger, M.: Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 
xx. 
11 Ibid., p. xxi. 
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word Ereignis, as it has been thought by Heidegger, in the light of the enabling, 
conditioning, letting-be experience as such that we have described before. By 
understanding Ereignis as enabling, they have accomplished the main step of translating this 
German word into English. It must then have been reasonably easy to detect the generally 
enabling power of the prefix en- in English, to find in it a valuable translation for the 
German prefix er-, to add the idea of “owning” which is suggested by the noun Eignis and 
thus to coin the new but highly usable term “enowning”.  
By doing so, the translators avoided two main dangers: 1) They didn’t simply look 
in the dictionary in order to find that Ereignis normally means “event” – a sense that 
Heidegger never assigns to his understanding of Ereignis. If they had done so, they would 
have only established an English equivalent for a German word. 2) Due to their truly 
philosophical and thoughtful understanding of enabling as a mysterious and deeply original 
experience of life itself, Emad & Maly avoided the temptation to simply equate Er-eignis 
with “appropriation”. As they put it in their defence, appropriation means seizing 
something without negotiating, thus implying a purely active, ruling, dominating and 
hegemonic experience. Appropriation is not trans-lation and hence doesn’t imply that truly 
liberating and freeing act of bearing and giving birth to an “other”. On the contrary, to 
appropriate means to pull something to oneself in order to enforce the stability and identity. 
Appropriation serves to enforce the establishment, the stability, the rule, the domination, 
the hegemony. As I said before, there are two types of unity: 1. a “good” one, i.e. a unity 
for the sake of the pure and maximal differentiation of its constituents within the limits of 
that unity, thus preserving a benefic tension between them – it is, as Emad & Maly call it, 
“an un-possessive owning”. 2. a “bad” unity, i.e. a unity that accumulates constituents 
simply by summing up more and more individuals, in order to enforce its rule and 
domination. This latter unity is implied by “appropriation”. That’s why the translation of 
Ereignis by “appropriation” is not only a wrong translation as many other, but it goes against 
the sense conveyed by Heidegger to Ereignis. 
 One can see that translation is a highly dangerous act. Translation of philosophical 
texts is more dangerous than other because it implies an awareness of the meaning of 
translation as such, namely translation as a mutual enabling of the translator and of the text 
translated. But translation of Heidegger’s texts is even more dangerous, because it implies 
an acute awareness of the profound sense he has attributed to translation and to enabling as 
such: this verb points to the main essence of human understanding, reading, speaking, 
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learning and, of course, living and giving birth as a relation between “own”-ness and 
“other”-ness. 
 
 Let me close with some further remarks on the experience of translation. One 
could ask why Heidegger has never translated himself anything. If we remember what 
translation originally means, then few persons have translated more Greek, Latin, German 
or French philosophers into German as Heidegger has done. One could say without 
exaggeration that his whole work is composed only of translations of other philosophers or 
of own writings about the sense of translation as enowning. Why did Heidegger do that? 
Why didn’t he develop his own philosophical ideas into some kind of system? In the light of 
things said before, it has become clear that “own”-ness receives a totally new sense in 
Heidegger: namely, as that state of being characterized by the extreme openness to “other”-
ness. The self, the “own” can be arrived at only by opening the widest field and by 
traversing the broadest element available to mankind. What this field and element is, 
Heidegger has said it incessantly in over 100 volumes: it is “being”. By discussing with 
other philosophers and other languages Heidegger discloses his own ideas and the powers 
of his own language. If one looks at Heidegger’s long lasting translation of the Pre-
Socratics, one understands a simple but essential fact: by translating the Greeks into 
German, Heidegger does two things simultaneously: 1. he enables the obscure Greek texts 
of Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus to speak from within their Greek world but in 
the element of the German language; 2. he enables his own German philosophical language 
to become “more German” than it already is.  
The Greeks per se don’t exist any more – but they can be enabled to be within a new 
field or element, namely ours. We, on the other side, have to become what we are – and 
thus must be enabled to be within an old field or element, namely the Greek world, which 
constitutes our oldest heritage. The newest present and the oldest past belong together as 
the two constituents of the essential movement of translation as enowning. Our “own” is 
their “other” and vice versa. All what we have to do is to keep true translation on the move 
and not to let it become an establishment. 
	  
